A week from Thursday will mark the 14th anniversary of one of the most legendary performances in NBA history. As the clock wound down in a meaningless blowout over the playoff-bound New Jersey Nets, Atlanta Hawks guard Bob Sura sought to become the first player in seven years to record a triple-double in three consecutive games. Egged on by teammates, Sura threw the ball off the backboard to intentionally miss a layup so he could collect his 10th rebound.
The NBA later rescinded it, ruling that since Sura hadn’t made a legitimate shot attempt, it couldn’t be counted as a rebound. His final stat line included 22 points, 11 assists and nine rebounds. It left Sura as a footnote in history, both as an infamous triple-double seeker, and for his impact on the Hawks’ position in the 2004 NBA Draft Lottery.
To appreciate Sura’s magical half-season in Atlanta, we rewind to February of 2004 when the Hawks unloaded recently-acquired forward Rasheed Wallace to the Detroit Pistons for Chris Mills, Sura and a first round pick Atlanta turned into high schooler Josh Smith that summer. The transaction grew out of an earlier salary dump in which the Hawks sent Shareef Abdur-Rahim, Theo Ratliff and Dan Dickau to the Portland Trail Blazers for the expiring contracts of Wallace and Wesley Person.
Abdur-Rahim was owed $28 million and Ratliff $21 million over two seasons for a Hawks team that was up against the luxury tax despite the league’s fourth-worst record. Dispatching Abdur-Rahim also ended a sad Hawks era that followed the disastrous decision to trade the draft rights to future Hall of Famer Pau Gasol to obtain him.
Former Hawks PR director Arthur Triche said he believed Atlanta never intended to keep Wallace.
I don't think Billy Knight's intention was to ever keep Roscoe ('Sheed's nickname). The franchise was rebuilding (sounds familiar??) and looking to accumulate picks (sounds familiar??).
I was with Sheed on the day we traded him and at the time, he was disappointed, but DET won.
— exhoopsprguy (@exhoopsPRguy) April 2, 2018
“What this does is accelerate the process of rebuilding,” Hawks GM Billy Knight told the Associated Press at the time. “This was a deal that gets us financially healthy and makes us a player in the free-agent market.”
With that goal in mind, Wallace was sent to the Pistons, where he would win an NBA championship the same season, while the Bob Sura Era commenced in Atlanta. Sura concluded his partial season with the Hawks with 20 games scoring in double-digits in 27 appearances. That included 32 points, eight rebounds, and five assists in an April 2 win over an Orlando Magic team that would finish with the league’s worst record and ultimately win the first overall pick, which it used to draft Atlanta native Dwight Howard.
Three games later, Sura notched a triple-double in a win over the Chicago Bulls, followed by another in a win over the Celtics before falling short against the Nets. That made Sura a significant contributor to the Hawks winning four of its final seven games to finish with a 28-54 record identical to the L.A. Clippers. The Hawks went 10-19 after obtaining him.
Which brings us to Sura’s true lasting impact on the Hawks organization. Just over a year after his final game for the Hawks, Sura would play his final NBA game as a member of the Houston Rockets. He wasn’t a part of Atlanta’s long-term plans … or any other team’s. But when the Hawks tied the Clippers for the fourth-worst record, it put Atlanta in a precarious position in the NBA Draft Lottery.
The expansion Charlotte Bobcats, now the Charlotte Hornets, were set to enter the league in the 2004-05 season and were assigned the fourth pick in the draft. This meant that any team that failed to gain a top-three position via the lottery would pick no higher than fifth.
The Magic held the best odds with a 25 percent chance at the first overall pick and a 64 percent chance to stay in the top three. Orlando won the right to pick first, then the Clippers crashed the top three by moving up to pick second. Since the Hawks finished tied with the Clippers, the two teams split the 209 winning lottery combinations the fourth and fifth-worst teams would normally have.
Per NBA rules, since the number of combinations was uneven, a coin flip gave 105 combinations to the Clippers and 104 to the Hawks. That coin flip would have also given the Clippers the higher pick in the event that neither the Hawks nor the Clippers moved into the top three. As fate would have it, one of those combinations moved the Clippers up to the second slot. The Bulls, with the second-worst record, won the right to pick third.
Among teams with the three worst records, the Wizards were victimized by L.A.’s move up. When Washington failed to secure a top-three pick, it tumbled all the way to fifth thanks to the Bobcats’ pre-assigned fourth position. That dropped the Hawks to sixth. Had the Hawks lost only one more game, Atlanta would have held a 38 percent chance to land in the top three while the Clippers’ odds dropped to 29 percent.
That’s not to blame Atlanta’s historic ineptitude in the draft on Bob Sura. Roland Beech of 82games.com evaluated team performance in the NBA Draft from 1989 to 2008 and determined that the Hawks were tied with the Knicks for worst return on expected value. In the 2004 NBA Draft, Atlanta had the chance to select 3-and-D pioneers such as Luol Deng, who went to the Bulls with the seventh pick, and Andre Iguodala, who went ninth to the 76ers. Instead, the Hawks selected broken-shot journeyman Josh Childress with the sixth pick. Atlanta would select Marvin Williams over Chris Paul and Deron Williams with the second pick the next year.
But Sura’s blaze of glory in Atlanta does faintly echo through the events of Sunday evening. The modern-day Hawks defeated the Orlando Magic, owners of the league’s fourth-worst record, 94-88 behind a career-high and Bob Sura-esque 19 points from rookie wing Tyler Dorsey. The Hawks entered the game tied with the Memphis Grizzlies for the league’s second-worst record. The win draws Atlanta even with the Magic with 22 wins while the Hawks remain a half-game lower in the overall standings with 55 losses to Orlando’s 54.
The Hawks jumped to the NBA’s third-toughest remaining schedule behind only the Lakers and Thunder once Sunday’s games became final. Memphis has the 15th-hardest remaining schedule, Orlando is 18th and the Phoenix Suns 19th. All five of Atlanta’s remaining games are against teams in playoff position while the Magic have three remaining against teams eliminated from the playoffs, the Suns two and the Grizzlies one.
In other words, had the Hawks lost to the Magic Sunday, they would have been in position to potentially lose their final five games. That would have left Atlanta with an outcome no worse than a tie with Memphis for the second-worst record and a split of lottery combinations like the Hawks had with the Clippers in 2004.
Through a buyout of out Ersan Ilyasova’s contract in February, the Hawks avoided a repeat of the mistake it made with Sura in 2004. Ilyasova had the second-best net rating among Hawks with at least 1000 minutes this season. Since he wasn’t in Atlanta’s long term plans, the team released him and allowed him to join a 76ers team that is ready to win now.
Since the NBA fined Mavericks owner Mark Cuban $600,000 in February for publicly stating a desire for his team to lose games to improve lottery position, the Hawks have beaten the playoff-bound Pacers and Jazz. Perhaps unwisely, the Hawks have also beaten the Suns and Magic in games that could impact the final NBA Draft order.
No one can question the Hawks’ will to win. But unlike the legendary Bob Sura, many of the Hawks who played Sunday are under contract beyond this season. Sura could chase triple-doubles with a carefree attitude since he was nearing the end of his career. The young Hawks could see the team’s future winning potential dramatically effected by where the team lands in this summer’s NBA Draft.
Reviewing the Nurkic Trade: Denver’s Perspective
The Denver Nuggets have been on a miraculous run this postseason, but that doesn’t mean that they’re infallible. Drew Maresca reviews the 2017 trade that sent Jusuf Nurkic from Denver to Portland.
The Denver Nuggets are fresh off of a 114-106 win over the Los Angeles Lakers in the Western Conference Finals, pulling within three wins of the franchise’s first trip to the NBA Finals. But what if I told you that the Nuggets’ roster could be even more talented by acting more deliberately in a trade from three years ago?
While Denver won on Tuesday night, they lost a nail bitter on Sunday – for which most of the blame has been pointed at a defensive breakdown by Nuggets’ center Mason Plumlee, who was procured in the aforementioned 2017 trade. What did it cost Denver, you ask? Just Jusuf Nurkic and a first-round pick.
Nurkic was a 2014-15 All-Rookie second team member. He played 139 games over 2.5 seasons in Denver, averaging 7.5 points and 5.9 rebounds in approximately 18 minutes per game. He showed serious promise, but Denver had numerous reasons to pursue a trade: he’d suffered a few relatively serious injuries early in his career (and he’s continued to be injury-prone in Portland), butted heads with head coach Michael Malone and – most importantly – the Nuggets stumbled on to Nikola Jokic.
The Nuggets eventually attempted a twin-tower strategy with both in the starting line-up, but that experiment was short-lived — with Jokic ultimately asking to move to the team’s second unit.
The Nuggets traded Nurkic to the Portland Trail Blazers in February 2017 (along with a first-round pick) in exchange for Plumlee, a second-round pick and cash considerations. Ironically, the first-round pick included in the deal became Justin Jackson, who was used to procure another center, Zach Collins – but more on that in a bit.
As of February 2017, Plumlee was considered the better player of the two. He was averaging a career-high 11 points, 8.1 rebounds and 4.0 assists through 54 games – but it was clear that at 27, he’d already maximized his talent.
Conversely, Nurkic was only 23 at the time of the trade with significant, untapped upside. In his first few seasons with Portland, Nurkic averaged 15 points and 9.8 rebounds per game, while establishing himself as a rising star. As noted above, injuries have continued to be a problem. Nurkic suffered a compound fracture in his tibia and fibula in March 2019, forcing him to miss a majority of this current campaign. The COVID-19-related play stoppage in March gave Nurkic extra time to get his body right, and he returned to action in July inside the bubble.
And he did so with a vengeance. Nurkic demonstrated superior strength and footwork, and he flashed the dominance that Portland hoped he would develop, posting eight double-doubles in 18 contests. He averaged 17.6 points and 10.3 rebounds per game and while his play dipped a bit in the playoffs – partially due to a matchup with first-team All-NBA star Anthony Davis – he still managed 14.2 points and 10.4 rebounds in the five-game series. So it’s fair to say that Nurkic is still on his way toward stardom.
But the Nuggets are in the conference finals – so all’s well that ends well, right? Not so fast. To his credit, Plumlee is exactly who Denver expected him to be. He’s averaged 7.5 points and 5.5 rebounds per game in three seasons with Denver since 2017 – but to be fair, Plumlee is asked to do less in Denver than he had in Portland. Still, it’s fairly obvious that they’re just not that comparable.
Plumlee is a good passer and an above-average defender that’ll compete hard and isn’t afraid to get dirty – but he has limitations. He doesn’t stretch the floor and he is a sub-par free throw shooter (53.5 percent in 2019-20). More importantly, he’s simply not a major offensive threat and his repertoire of moves is limited.
High-level takeaway: Defenses tend to game plan for opponents they view as major threats – Nurkic falls into this category. Other guys pack the stat sheet through putback attempts, open looks and single coverage alongside the guys for whom opposing defenses game plan – that’s a more appropriate description of Plumlee.
On to the wrench thrown in by Zach Collins’ involvement. Statistically, Collins is about as effective as Plumlee – he averaged 7 points and 6.3 rebounds through only 11 games in 2019-20 due to various injuries – and he possesses more upside. The 22-year-old is not as reliable as Plumlee but given his age and skill set, he’s a far better option as a support player playing off the bench. He stretches the floor (36.8 percent on three-point attempts in 2019-20), is an above-average free throw shooter (75 percent this season) and is a good defender. Looking past Nurkic for a moment, would the Nuggets prefer a 22-year-old center that stretches the floor and defends or a 30-year-old energy guy?
Regardless of your answer to that question, it’s hard to argue that Nurkic should have returned more than Plumlee, definitely so when you factor in the first-round pick Denver included. There is obviously more at play: Denver was probably considering trading Nurkic for some time before they acted – did they feel that they could increase his trade value prior to the trade deadline in 2016-17? Maybe. Further, Nurkic and his agent could have influenced the Nuggets’ decision at the 2017 deadline, threatening to stonewall Denver in negotiations.
Had Nurkic been more patient or the Nuggets acted sooner before it became abundantly clear that he was on the move, Denver’s roster could be even more stacked than it is now. Ultimately, the Nuggets have a plethora of talent and will be fine – while it appears that Nurkic found a long-term home in Portland, where he owns the paint offensively. Denver can’t be thrilled about assisting a division rival, but they’re still in an enviable position today and should be for years to come.
But despite that, this deal should go down as a cautionary tale – it’s not only the bottom feeders of the league who make missteps. Even the savviest of front offices overthink deals. Sometimes that works in their favor, and other times it does not.
NBA Daily: They Guessed Wrong
Matt John reflects on some of the key decisions that were made last summer, and how their disappointing results hurt both team outlooks and players’ legacies.
It doesn’t sound possible, but did you know that the crazy NBA summer of 2019 was, in fact, over a year ago? Wildly, in any normal, non-pandemic season, it all would have been over three months ago and, usually, media days would be right around the corner, but not this time. The 2019-20 NBA season is slated to end sometime in early to mid-October, so the fact that the last NBA off-season was over a year ago hasn’t really dawned on anyone yet. Craziest of all, even though there will still be an offseason, there technically won’t be any summer.
Coronavirus has really messed up the NBA’s order. Of course, there are much worse horrors that COVID-19 has inflicted upon the world – but because of what it’s done to the NBA, let’s focus on that and go back to the summer of 2019. It felt like an eternity, but the Golden State Warriors’ three-year reign had finally reached its end. The Toronto Raptors’ victory over the tyranny that was the Hamptons Five – as battered as they were – made it feel like order had been restored to the NBA. There was more to it than that though.
Klay Thompson’s and Kevin Durant’s season-ending injuries, along with the latter skipping town to join Kyrie Irving in Brooklyn meant two things.
1. Golden State was down for the count
2. Brooklyn’s time wasn’t coming until next year.
A one-year window was open. Even if neither Golden State nor Brooklyn posed the same threat that the former did when it had Kevin Durant, those were two contenders out of commission. If there was a time to go all in, it was in 2019.
Milwaukee certainly seemed to go all in. For the most part. Malcolm Brogdon’s departure seemed a little odd since he was arguably their best non-Giannis playmaker when they were in crunch time. Not to mention there was nothing really stopping the Bucks from keeping him except for money. Detractors will call out Milwaukee for electing to cheap out by not keeping Brogdon and hence, avoiding the luxury tax. However, there’s more to it than that.
Milwaukee thought it had enough with the core it had on its roster. Coming off the best season they had put up since the eighties, they believed the franchise built the right team to contend. There was an argument that keeping Brogdon may have been overkill with their guard depth – let’s not forget that Donte DiVincenzo did a solid job in Brogdon’s role as the backup facilitator. This would have been more defensible had it not been for Milwaukee picking the wrong guy to let go. That was the indefensible part- electing to keep Eric Bledsoe over Brogdon.
Bledsoe wasn’t necessarily a bad investment. No one’s complaining about an almost 15 point average on 47/34/79 splits or playing individual defense tight enough to get named on the All-Defensive second team. By all accounts, Bledsoe earns his keep. That is until the playoffs. Bledsoe’s postseason woes have been a weight ever since he first entered Milwaukee, and this postseason was more of the same.
Bledsoe’s numbers dwindled to just 11.7 points on 39/25/81 splits, and Milwaukee getting ousted in five games at the hands of Miami made his struggles stand out even more than it had ever been. Bledsoe may be the better athlete and the better defender, but Brogdon’s all-around offensive savvy and his only slight dropoff defensively from Brogdon would have made him a bit more reliable.
Milwaukee guessed wrong when they opted to extend Bledsoe before the postseason last year when they could have waited until that very time to evaluate who to keep around. Now they face a hell of a lot more questions than they did at the end of last season – questions that may have been avoided had they made the right choice.
Now they could have kept both of them, yes, but it’s not totally unreasonable to think that maybe their approach with the luxury tax would have worked and maybe they would still be in the postseason right now had they gone with the homegrown talent. And just maybe, there wouldn’t be nearly as much of this Greek Freak uncertainty.
The Houston Rockets can relate. They got bruised up by a team that everyone thought Houston had the edge on going into the series and then crushed by the Lakers. Now, Mike D’Antoni is gone. The full-time small ball experiment likely did not work out. Since the Rockets emptied most of their assets to bring in Russell Westbrook and Robert Covington, there may not be a route in which they can become better than they presently are.
The mistake wasn’t trading for Russell Westbrook. The mistake was trading Chris Paul.
To be fair, most everybody severely overestimated Chris Paul’s decline. He’s not among the best of the best anymore, but he’s still pretty darn close. He deserved his All-NBA second team selection as well as finishing No. 7 overall in MVP voting. OKC had no business being as good as they were this season, and Paul was the driving force as to why.
For all we know, the previously-assumed tension between Chris Paul and James Harden would have made its way onto the court no matter what. Even so, Houston’s biggest obstacle in the Bay Area had crumbled. If they had just stayed the course, maybe they’re still in the postseason too.
To their credit, none of this may have happened had it not been for the Kawhi Leonard decision. Had he chosen differently, the Thunder never blow it up, and Houston might have very well been the favorite in the Western Conference. Instead, the Rockets took a step back from being in the title discussion to dark horse. But at least they can take pride knowing that they weren’t expected to win it all – the Clippers can’t.
Seeing the Clippers fall well short expectations begs the question if they too got it wrong. The answer is, naturally: of course not. They may have paid a hefty price for Paul George, but the only way they were getting Kawhi Leonard – one of the best players of his generation – was if PG-13 came in the package. As lofty as it was, anyone would have done the same thing if they were in their shoes. They didn’t get it wrong. Kawhi did.
On paper, the Clippers had the most talented roster in the entire league. It seemed like they had every hole filled imaginable. Surrounding Leonard and George was three-point shooting, versatility, a productive second unit, an experienced coach – you name it. There was nothing stopping them from breaking the franchise’s long-lasting curse. Except themselves.
Something felt off about them. They alienated opponents. They alienated each other. At times, they played rather lackadaisically, like the title had already been signed, sealed, and delivered to them. The media all assumed they’d cut the malarkey and get their act together – but that moment never really came. They had their chances to put Denver away, but even if they had, after seeing their struggles to beat them – and to be fair Dallas too – would their day of destiny with the Lakers have really lived up to the hype?
Even if it was never in the cards, one can’t help but wonder what could have happened had Kawhi chosen to stay with the team he won his second title with.
Toronto was the most impressive team in this league this season. They still managed to stay at the top of the east in spite of losing an all-timer like Leonard. That team had every component of a winner except a superstar. They had the right culture for a championship team. Just not the right talent. The Clippers were the exact opposite. They had the right talent for a championship team but not the right culture. That’s why the Raptors walked away from the postseason feeling proud of themselves for playing to their full potential while the Clippers writhed in disappointment and angst over their future.
In the end, everyone mentioned here may ultimately blame what happened to their season on the extenuating circumstances from the pandemic. The Bucks’ chemistry never fully returned when the Bubble started. Contracting COVID and dealing with quad problems prevented Westbrook from reviving the MVP-type player he was before the hiatus. As troubling as the Clippers had played, the extra time they would have had to work things out in a normal season was taken away from them.
For all we know, next year will be a completely different story. The Rockets, Bucks, and Kawhi may ultimately have their faith rewarded for what they did in the summer of 2019 – but that will only be mere speculation until the trio can change the story.
Looking Toward The Draft: Power Forwards
Basketball Insiders continues their NBA Draft watch, this time with the power forwards.
We got some updated NBA draft news this week when the league announced that several key dates have been pushed back including the draft, the start of free agency and the beginning of the 2020-21 season.
The 2020 draft was originally scheduled for Oct. 16, but it will now likely occur sometime in November. Obviously, with the COVID-19 pandemic still wildly out of control in the United States, all of these potential deadlines are fluid and subject to change.
With that said, we’re continuing our position by position breakdown here at Basketball Insiders of some of the top 2020 draft prospects. We looked at the point guards and shooting guards last week, and this week we’re covering the small forwards and power forwards.
The power forward crop, like the draft overall, doesn’t appear to be as strong as recent years, that doesn’t mean there aren’t potential contributors and high-level NBA players available, as well as one who might just turn out to be a star-caliber player.
Onyeka Okongwu, USC – 19 years old
Okongwu is the player who just might develop into a star on some level. He was actually underrated in high school and was snubbed for a McDonald’s All-American selection his senior year. He established himself early on at USC as the team’s best player as a freshman and now appears to have turned some heads.
He’s been mentioned as a lottery pick and in some mock drafts, he’s top 4-5. He possesses a great all-around skill-set; he can score in the post, he can put the ball on the floor and attack and he can shoot. But perhaps his biggest attribute is his versatility on the defensive end. He’s got quick feet and mobility and can guard multiple positions.
Okongwu might actually play center in the NBA, especially in small-ball lineups, but he’s mostly played power forward and so he’ll probably see time there in the league. His skill-set fits perfectly with today’s game.
Obi Toppin, Dayton – 22 years old
Toppin is one of the older players in the draft, and in recent history, players that age tend to slip on draft boards. In Toppin’s case, it looks like the reverse might actually be true. He’s been projected as a lottery pick, and even going in the top 3.
He’s an incredibly athletic player who thrives in the open court. He looks like he’ll do well in an up-tempo offensive system that has capable playmakers who can find him in transition. He’s extremely active around the rim and he can finish strong. A decent shooter too, something he’ll need at the next level.
Toppin has the physical tools to be an effective defensive player, but that’s where the questions marks on him have been. In the NBA, he’s likely going to have to play and guard multiple positions. Whether or not he can adapt to that likely will answer the question as to what his ceiling can be.
Precious Achiuwa, Memphis – 20 years old
Achiuwa is another intriguing prospect. this writer actually got to watch him play in person while he was in high school and he was very impressive. He looked like a man among boys. He’s projected to be a late lottery pick.
He has an NBA-ready body and he’s got some toughness around the rim and in the paint. He was a double-double threat during his one season at Memphis and his knack for rebounding is something that should translate to the NBA. He’s a very good defender too, in particular, as a rim protector. He’s very quick and has the ability to guard multiple positions.
One of the main knocks on Achiuwa is his shooting ability. He didn’t shoot that well in college and power forwards being able to space the floor is almost a requirement in today’s NBA game. It’s something he can certainly work on and improve on though.
Paul Reed, DePaul – 21 years old
Xavier Tillman, Michigan State – 21 years old
Killian Tillie, Gonzaga – 22 years old