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Little Giants: Utah’s Big/Small Conundrum

Ben Dowsett explores the Utah Jazz’s options when it comes to playing (and countering) small ball.

Ben Dowsett



In a league that seems to get smaller and more spaced out by the week in recent seasons, the Utah Jazz appear to be heading in the opposite direction. Their primary identity only got bigger last season when Rudy Gobert left the bench, bringing the starting frontcourt (Gobert, Derrick Favors and Gordon Hayward) to an average height of over 6’10. One piece is down for the season in Dante Exum, but with Alec Burks and Rodney Hood battling for the bulk of the shooting guard minutes, the Jazz are set to head into their core’s prime featuring a starting unit without a single guy under 6’6.

This alone doesn’t prohibit Utah from changing with the times, but their relative lack of spacing across the lineup has presented roadblocks and will continue to do so. Exum was a non-threat as a shooter in his rookie season, and his in-house replacements this year either have a track record as sub-par shooters at the professional level (Trey Burke, Raul Neto) or so many other question marks that it’s unclear if they’ll see the floor consistently (Bryce Cotton). Gobert is doubtful to ever be a threat outside of the paint, and Favors only became a reliable mid-range shooter last season. Things could tighten up quickly in Salt Lake City.

Look a little closer, though, and the makings of a more versatile team are visible. For one, somewhat unlike a few of his peers around the NBA who seem reluctant to embrace the league’s spacing revolution, head coach Quin Snyder knows the value of adaptability.

“We’re going to play different ways, as appropriate,” Snyder told Basketball Insiders. “We have to be able to do both. We have to stick with who we are and put our best players on the floor, and I think we also need to be prepared to play with a smaller lineup in the course of the game and in specific games as well.”

The Jazz have the personnel to make Snyder’s words reality, though doing so will require new bits of emphasis from certain guys. They went full-on “small-ball” (with just one of Gobert, Favors or Trevor Booker on the floor) for limited stretches last season; Snyder will need to see more to gauge their long-term viability, but there were encouraging nuggets to be found in these small samples. Gobert or Favors as a pick-and-roll dive man had bits of success with shooters spotting up around them, and Booker’s own shooting prowess makes five-out units an intriguing possibility. Hayward is in the best shape of his career, more muscular and well-conditioned than might have even seemed possible coming out of Butler six years ago. He even recently told Basketball Insiders he’d “be comfortable with [playing power forward].”

Perhaps more intriguing, and certainly more in line with Snyder’s general philosophy, is the possibility of units able to space the floor without sacrificing any actual size down low. Utah’s bigs beyond Favors and Gobert have real upside here, even if utilizing them primarily as floor-stretchers will be a departure from much of their careers to this point.

Booker is the most obvious candidate, a guy who, at 6’7, fits the “small” designation in height alone. He’s nearly as effective a rebounder as Favors and a rock down low, meaning he comes without some of the traditional concerns for true wings shifting up a spot. Booker actually shot a better percentage from deep last season than Draymond Green, essentially the league’s prototype for this sort of style, and has a number of other elements to his game that could afford him a similar reputation offensively if he emphasizes the right things.

There’s less of a track record for European transplant Tibor Pleiss, and none for 12th overall pick Trey Lyles. The Jazz are high on both as shooters, though – Pleiss hit 66 of 90 attempts from deep in a summer workout, according to general manager Dennis Lindsey, and already has folks present for early Jazz training camp action surprised at the touch he has stored in that 7’3 frame. Lyles has shooter’s form despite lukewarm college numbers on a limited sample, and his array of other ball skills will make him a real value if his mechanics translate into results.

“There [are] going to be times this year where we have other lineups or other options that’ll be more efficient and successful in those situations. We’re aware of it, I think the league’s aware of it,” Snyder said. “There’s always trends, and you’re not trying to buck a trend, you’re just trying to take advantage of the personnel you have and play the right way for you.”

Snyder doesn’t want to compromise the team’s identity, and that begins with Favors and Gobert up front. Guys like Booker and Pleiss could provide some options with the right results, but giving in and turning straight to those avenues at the first sign of trouble opens the Jazz up to smart opposition goading them away from their preferred tandem for uncomfortable periods. Favors and Gobert played over 20 minutes a game together last season once the latter found his way into the starting lineup – a number that feels more like a baseline this season if both stay healthy.

Opponents became more aggressive about pushing their own smaller units on the Favors-Gobert combo near the end of last season; both will have to adjust to keep it from happening with success too often this year. There’s added pressure to stretch the floor out and balance the scales if the opposition is doing the same thing on the other end, and Favors knows much of that falls on him.

“I know Rudy’s going to be mostly in the low-post area and the paint more than I will, so this offseason I took it upon myself to continue to work on my jumper and extend my range,” Favors said. “Work on my high-post game so that when Rudy seals, I can hit him with a pass.”

That last bit is vital. Gobert began seeing wings guarding him for short periods down the stretch last year, and his general inability to punish them could be a big hurdle if it remains. He and the coaching staff are well aware of this, working hard over the offseason on Rudy recognizing and exploiting those mismatches more decisively with added strength and quick duck-ins to the low block. It’s an uphill battle given his size and lack of ball skills, though, and teams will continue to be more adventurous with him if he can’t improve his efficiency on looks like these:

Snyder knows he’ll have to get creative at times, and he is fortunate to have guys who trust him to make the right calls. Favors and Gobert came a long way as a symbiotic pairing as last year wore on – “I love to play with Derrick,” Rudy said on media day – and each has talked about how big an asset their passing is, both with each other and the other three players on the floor.

Things will become exponentially easier if Favors can flash certain stretch elements more consistently, but Snyder doesn’t want him reaching beyond his skill set. He’s already all but ruled out the possibility of Favors becoming a consistent three-point shooter (Favors himself has essentially done the same), preferring he stay within himself.

“Obviously he’s worked hard on his shooting,” Snyder said. “It’s interesting – sometimes guys that don’t have three-point range, they’re not as consistent [if you’re] constantly wanting them to back up. David West has done pretty well being a great mid-range shooter. There’s a bunch of guys out there. LaMarcus Aldridge is a great mid-range shooter. I’m not concerned about Fav being a three-point guy. I want [him] to be consistent and aggressive when he’s in his range.

“I like the idea of him being able to be a better playmaking four, where his ball skills are better, his passing, his ball-handling. And what that means is he’s probably going to be more aggressive offensively out on the floor.”

Shooting threes would take a guy like Favors farther away from the basket and potentially damage Utah’s powerful offensive rebounding, another tool at their disposal to combat teams downsizing on them. Snyder is cognizant of the back-and-forth, and of another strong element in both players’ game.

“A lot of it involves them screening, too,” Snyder said. “If you’re not going to space out to the three-point line, you can be effective offensively – you want to be a factor, you want people to have to guard you, [and] any type of cutting or screening accomplishes that. It’s harder to do – it takes more timing, it takes more work.”

The defensive side of the ball might be the even bigger test for Favors, who’s already proven he can punish smaller guys and do a good job toggling back and forth between the four and five spots. His track record guarding out to the perimeter is less robust; there’s no concrete indication he can’t do it for larger periods, but also little evidence that he can. The task of checking any opponent’s de facto power forward will fall on Favors’ shoulders when he and Gobert share the court, and Utah’s ability to remain elite defensively against the league’s best offenses could hang in the balance.

“Obviously it’ll be a challenge, because I’m a big and most of the guys playing the four position now [are] three-men,” Favors said. “It’ll be a challenge, and I’m looking forward to it.”

His sentiment didn’t specifically echo the team’s as a whole, but it may as well have. The Jazz face some stiff tests ahead, up against the largest set of expectations this group has ever experienced. They’ll be challenged both by opposing talent and the growing modernity of the NBA game. They’re ready for a trial by fire.

Ben Dowsett is a Deputy Editor and in-depth basketball analyst based in Salt Lake City. He covers the Jazz on a credentialed basis for Basketball Insiders, and has previously appeared in the Sports Illustrated and TrueHoop Networks. He can be found on Twitter at @Ben_Dowsett.


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Reviewing the Nurkic Trade: Denver’s Perspective

The Denver Nuggets have been on a miraculous run this postseason, but that doesn’t mean that they’re infallible. Drew Maresca reviews the 2017 trade that sent Jusuf Nurkic from Denver to Portland.

Drew Maresca



The Denver Nuggets are fresh off of a 114-106 win over the Los Angeles Lakers in the Western Conference Finals, pulling within three wins of the franchise’s first trip to the NBA Finals. But what if I told you that the Nuggets’ roster could be even more talented by acting more deliberately in a trade from three years ago?

While Denver won on Tuesday night, they lost a nail bitter on Sunday – for which most of the blame has been pointed at a defensive breakdown by Nuggets’ center Mason Plumlee, who was procured in the aforementioned 2017 trade. What did it cost Denver, you ask? Just Jusuf Nurkic and a first-round pick.

Nurkic was a 2014-15 All-Rookie second team member. He played 139 games over 2.5 seasons in Denver, averaging 7.5 points and 5.9 rebounds in approximately 18 minutes per game. He showed serious promise, but Denver had numerous reasons to pursue a trade: he’d suffered a few relatively serious injuries early in his career (and he’s continued to be injury-prone in Portland), butted heads with head coach Michael Malone and – most importantly – the Nuggets stumbled on to Nikola Jokic.

The Nuggets eventually attempted a twin-tower strategy with both in the starting line-up, but that experiment was short-lived — with Jokic ultimately asking to move to the team’s second unit.

The Nuggets traded Nurkic to the Portland Trail Blazers in February 2017 (along with a first-round pick) in exchange for Plumlee, a second-round pick and cash considerations. Ironically, the first-round pick included in the deal became Justin Jackson, who was used to procure another center, Zach Collins – but more on that in a bit.

As of February 2017, Plumlee was considered the better player of the two. He was averaging a career-high 11 points, 8.1 rebounds and 4.0 assists through 54 games – but it was clear that at 27, he’d already maximized his talent.

Conversely, Nurkic was only 23 at the time of the trade with significant, untapped upside. In his first few seasons with Portland, Nurkic averaged 15 points and 9.8 rebounds per game, while establishing himself as a rising star. As noted above, injuries have continued to be a problem. Nurkic suffered a compound fracture in his tibia and fibula in March 2019, forcing him to miss a majority of this current campaign. The COVID-19-related play stoppage in March gave Nurkic extra time to get his body right, and he returned to action in July inside the bubble.

And he did so with a vengeance. Nurkic demonstrated superior strength and footwork, and he flashed the dominance that Portland hoped he would develop, posting eight double-doubles in 18 contests. He averaged 17.6 points and 10.3 rebounds per game and while his play dipped a bit in the playoffs – partially due to a matchup with first-team All-NBA star Anthony Davis – he still managed 14.2 points and 10.4 rebounds in the five-game series. So it’s fair to say that Nurkic is still on his way toward stardom.

But the Nuggets are in the conference finals – so all’s well that ends well, right? Not so fast. To his credit, Plumlee is exactly who Denver expected him to be. He’s averaged 7.5 points and 5.5 rebounds per game in three seasons with Denver since 2017 – but to be fair, Plumlee is asked to do less in Denver than he had in Portland. Still, it’s fairly obvious that they’re just not that comparable.

Plumlee is a good passer and an above-average defender that’ll compete hard and isn’t afraid to get dirty – but he has limitations. He doesn’t stretch the floor and he is a sub-par free throw shooter (53.5 percent in 2019-20). More importantly, he’s simply not a major offensive threat and his repertoire of moves is limited.

High-level takeaway: Defenses tend to game plan for opponents they view as major threats – Nurkic falls into this category. Other guys pack the stat sheet through putback attempts, open looks and single coverage alongside the guys for whom opposing defenses game plan – that’s a more appropriate description of Plumlee.

On to the wrench thrown in by Zach Collins’ involvement. Statistically, Collins is about as effective as Plumlee – he averaged 7 points and 6.3 rebounds through only 11 games in 2019-20 due to various injuries – and he possesses more upside. The 22-year-old is not as reliable as Plumlee but given his age and skill set, he’s a far better option as a support player playing off the bench. He stretches the floor (36.8 percent on three-point attempts in 2019-20), is an above-average free throw shooter (75 percent this season) and is a good defender. Looking past Nurkic for a moment, would the Nuggets prefer a 22-year-old center that stretches the floor and defends or a 30-year-old energy guy?

Regardless of your answer to that question, it’s hard to argue that Nurkic should have returned more than Plumlee, definitely so when you factor in the first-round pick Denver included. There is obviously more at play: Denver was probably considering trading Nurkic for some time before they acted – did they feel that they could increase his trade value prior to the trade deadline in 2016-17? Maybe. Further, Nurkic and his agent could have influenced the Nuggets’ decision at the 2017 deadline, threatening to stonewall Denver in negotiations.

Had Nurkic been more patient or the Nuggets acted sooner before it became abundantly clear that he was on the move, Denver’s roster could be even more stacked than it is now. Ultimately, the Nuggets have a plethora of talent and will be fine – while it appears that Nurkic found a long-term home in Portland, where he owns the paint offensively. Denver can’t be thrilled about assisting a division rival, but they’re still in an enviable position today and should be for years to come.

But despite that, this deal should go down as a cautionary tale – it’s not only the bottom feeders of the league who make missteps. Even the savviest of front offices overthink deals. Sometimes that works in their favor, and other times it does not.

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NBA Daily: They Guessed Wrong

Matt John reflects on some of the key decisions that were made last summer, and how their disappointing results hurt both team outlooks and players’ legacies.

Matt John



It doesn’t sound possible, but did you know that the crazy NBA summer of 2019 was, in fact, over a year ago? Wildly, in any normal, non-pandemic season, it all would have been over three months ago and, usually, media days would be right around the corner, but not this time. The 2019-20 NBA season is slated to end sometime in early to mid-October, so the fact that the last NBA off-season was over a year ago hasn’t really dawned on anyone yet. Craziest of all, even though there will still be an offseason, there technically won’t be any summer.

Coronavirus has really messed up the NBA’s order. Of course, there are much worse horrors that COVID-19 has inflicted upon the world – but because of what it’s done to the NBA, let’s focus on that and go back to the summer of 2019. It felt like an eternity, but the Golden State Warriors’ three-year reign had finally reached its end. The Toronto Raptors’ victory over the tyranny that was the Hamptons Five – as battered as they were – made it feel like order had been restored to the NBA. There was more to it than that though.

Klay Thompson’s and Kevin Durant’s season-ending injuries, along with the latter skipping town to join Kyrie Irving in Brooklyn meant two things.

1. Golden State was down for the count
2. Brooklyn’s time wasn’t coming until next year.

A one-year window was open. Even if neither Golden State nor Brooklyn posed the same threat that the former did when it had Kevin Durant, those were two contenders out of commission. If there was a time to go all in, it was in 2019.

Milwaukee certainly seemed to go all in. For the most part.  Malcolm Brogdon’s departure seemed a little odd since he was arguably their best non-Giannis playmaker when they were in crunch time. Not to mention there was nothing really stopping the Bucks from keeping him except for money. Detractors will call out Milwaukee for electing to cheap out by not keeping Brogdon and hence, avoiding the luxury tax. However, there’s more to it than that.

Milwaukee thought it had enough with the core it had on its roster. Coming off the best season they had put up since the eighties, they believed the franchise built the right team to contend. There was an argument that keeping Brogdon may have been overkill with their guard depth – let’s not forget that Donte DiVincenzo did a solid job in Brogdon’s role as the backup facilitator. This would have been more defensible had it not been for Milwaukee picking the wrong guy to let go. That was the indefensible part- electing to keep Eric Bledsoe over Brogdon.

Bledsoe wasn’t necessarily a bad investment. No one’s complaining about an almost 15 point average on 47/34/79 splits or playing individual defense tight enough to get named on the All-Defensive second team. By all accounts, Bledsoe earns his keep. That is until the playoffs. Bledsoe’s postseason woes have been a weight ever since he first entered Milwaukee, and this postseason was more of the same.

Bledsoe’s numbers dwindled to just 11.7 points on 39/25/81 splits, and Milwaukee getting ousted in five games at the hands of Miami made his struggles stand out even more than it had ever been. Bledsoe may be the better athlete and the better defender, but Brogdon’s all-around offensive savvy and his only slight dropoff defensively from Brogdon would have made him a bit more reliable.

Milwaukee guessed wrong when they opted to extend Bledsoe before the postseason last year when they could have waited until that very time to evaluate who to keep around. Now they face a hell of a lot more questions than they did at the end of last season – questions that may have been avoided had they made the right choice.

Now they could have kept both of them, yes, but it’s not totally unreasonable to think that maybe their approach with the luxury tax would have worked and maybe they would still be in the postseason right now had they gone with the homegrown talent. And just maybe, there wouldn’t be nearly as much of this Greek Freak uncertainty.

The Houston Rockets can relate. They got bruised up by a team that everyone thought Houston had the edge on going into the series and then crushed by the Lakers. Now, Mike D’Antoni is gone. The full-time small ball experiment likely did not work out. Since the Rockets emptied most of their assets to bring in Russell Westbrook and Robert Covington, there may not be a route in which they can become better than they presently are.

The mistake wasn’t trading for Russell Westbrook. The mistake was trading Chris Paul.

To be fair, most everybody severely overestimated Chris Paul’s decline. He’s not among the best of the best anymore, but he’s still pretty darn close. He deserved his All-NBA second team selection as well as finishing No. 7 overall in MVP voting. OKC had no business being as good as they were this season, and Paul was the driving force as to why.

For all we know, the previously-assumed tension between Chris Paul and James Harden would have made its way onto the court no matter what. Even so, Houston’s biggest obstacle in the Bay Area had crumbled. If they had just stayed the course, maybe they’re still in the postseason too.

To their credit, none of this may have happened had it not been for the Kawhi Leonard decision. Had he chosen differently, the Thunder never blow it up, and Houston might have very well been the favorite in the Western Conference. Instead, the Rockets took a step back from being in the title discussion to dark horse. But at least they can take pride knowing that they weren’t expected to win it all – the Clippers can’t.

Seeing the Clippers fall well short expectations begs the question if they too got it wrong. The answer is, naturally: of course not. They may have paid a hefty price for Paul George, but the only way they were getting Kawhi Leonard – one of the best players of his generation – was if PG-13 came in the package. As lofty as it was, anyone would have done the same thing if they were in their shoes. They didn’t get it wrong. Kawhi did.

On paper, the Clippers had the most talented roster in the entire league. It seemed like they had every hole filled imaginable. Surrounding Leonard and George was three-point shooting, versatility, a productive second unit, an experienced coach – you name it. There was nothing stopping them from breaking the franchise’s long-lasting curse. Except themselves.

Something felt off about them. They alienated opponents. They alienated each other. At times, they played rather lackadaisically, like the title had already been signed, sealed, and delivered to them. The media all assumed they’d cut the malarkey and get their act together – but that moment never really came. They had their chances to put Denver away, but even if they had, after seeing their struggles to beat them – and to be fair Dallas too – would their day of destiny with the Lakers have really lived up to the hype?

Even if it was never in the cards, one can’t help but wonder what could have happened had Kawhi chosen to stay with the team he won his second title with.

Toronto was the most impressive team in this league this season. They still managed to stay at the top of the east in spite of losing an all-timer like Leonard. That team had every component of a winner except a superstar. They had the right culture for a championship team. Just not the right talent. The Clippers were the exact opposite. They had the right talent for a championship team but not the right culture. That’s why the Raptors walked away from the postseason feeling proud of themselves for playing to their full potential while the Clippers writhed in disappointment and angst over their future.

In the end, everyone mentioned here may ultimately blame what happened to their season on the extenuating circumstances from the pandemic. The Bucks’ chemistry never fully returned when the Bubble started. Contracting COVID and dealing with quad problems prevented Westbrook from reviving the MVP-type player he was before the hiatus. As troubling as the Clippers had played, the extra time they would have had to work things out in a normal season was taken away from them.

For all we know, next year will be a completely different story. The Rockets, Bucks, and Kawhi may ultimately have their faith rewarded for what they did in the summer of 2019 – but that will only be mere speculation until the trio can change the story.

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Looking Toward The Draft: Power Forwards

Basketball Insiders continues their NBA Draft watch, this time with the power forwards.

David Yapkowitz



We got some updated NBA draft news this week when the league announced that several key dates have been pushed back including the draft, the start of free agency and the beginning of the 2020-21 season.

The 2020 draft was originally scheduled for Oct. 16, but it will now likely occur sometime in November. Obviously, with the COVID-19 pandemic still wildly out of control in the United States, all of these potential deadlines are fluid and subject to change.

With that said, we’re continuing our position by position breakdown here at Basketball Insiders of some of the top 2020 draft prospects. We looked at the point guards and shooting guards last week, and this week we’re covering the small forwards and power forwards.

The power forward crop, like the draft overall, doesn’t appear to be as strong as recent years, that doesn’t mean there aren’t potential contributors and high-level NBA players available, as well as one who might just turn out to be a star-caliber player.

Onyeka Okongwu, USC – 19 years old

Okongwu is the player who just might develop into a star on some level. He was actually underrated in high school and was snubbed for a McDonald’s All-American selection his senior year. He established himself early on at USC as the team’s best player as a freshman and now appears to have turned some heads.

He’s been mentioned as a lottery pick and in some mock drafts, he’s top 4-5. He possesses a great all-around skill-set; he can score in the post, he can put the ball on the floor and attack and he can shoot. But perhaps his biggest attribute is his versatility on the defensive end. He’s got quick feet and mobility and can guard multiple positions.

Okongwu might actually play center in the NBA, especially in small-ball lineups, but he’s mostly played power forward and so he’ll probably see time there in the league. His skill-set fits perfectly with today’s game.

Obi Toppin, Dayton – 22 years old

Toppin is one of the older players in the draft, and in recent history, players that age tend to slip on draft boards. In Toppin’s case, it looks like the reverse might actually be true. He’s been projected as a lottery pick, and even going in the top 3.

He’s an incredibly athletic player who thrives in the open court. He looks like he’ll do well in an up-tempo offensive system that has capable playmakers who can find him in transition. He’s extremely active around the rim and he can finish strong. A decent shooter too, something he’ll need at the next level.

Toppin has the physical tools to be an effective defensive player, but that’s where the questions marks on him have been. In the NBA, he’s likely going to have to play and guard multiple positions. Whether or not he can adapt to that likely will answer the question as to what his ceiling can be.

Precious Achiuwa, Memphis – 20 years old

Achiuwa is another intriguing prospect. this writer actually got to watch him play in person while he was in high school and he was very impressive. He looked like a man among boys. He’s projected to be a late lottery pick.

He has an NBA-ready body and he’s got some toughness around the rim and in the paint. He was a double-double threat during his one season at Memphis and his knack for rebounding is something that should translate to the NBA. He’s a very good defender too, in particular, as a rim protector. He’s very quick and has the ability to guard multiple positions.

One of the main knocks on Achiuwa is his shooting ability. He didn’t shoot that well in college and power forwards being able to space the floor is almost a requirement in today’s NBA game. It’s something he can certainly work on and improve on though.

Honorable Mentions:
Paul Reed, DePaul – 21 years old
Xavier Tillman, Michigan State – 21 years old
Killian Tillie, Gonzaga – 22 years old

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