The lottery reform voted in by the NBA’s Board of Governors last week won’t end tanking and could dramatically increase it. The reform targeted one specific form of tanking — the “race to the bottom,” where teams such as the Philadelphia 76ers positioned themselves to lose as many games as possible to maximize draft assets. The league reportedly characterized this round of changes as an “incremental” step in lottery reform. So what’s next? What further changes could or should be contemplated?
To answer this question, it should be noted that Basketball Insiders has previously dissected the motivations behind lottery reform. While the quest to end tanking gets all the headlines, the vastly more important — yet under-reported — issue is which teams have a chance to draft a generational talent capable of winning multiple championships. Since 1980, about 90 percent of NBA champions have had one of 11 superstars that were central contributors on multiple championship teams. Thus, to have a serious chance at contention, a team needs to acquire one of these generational talents that only come around about three times per decade. It’s through this prism of access to talent that we’ll examine other potential steps.
By looking at a comparison of the new lottery odds, which will take effect in the 2019 NBA Draft, it’s easy to understand why many are arguing that the latest lottery reform could increase tanking rather than decrease it.
Here is an ESPN graphic on how NBA Draft lottery odds change in 2019 pic.twitter.com/Jk8X7q0J3Z
— Adrian Wojnarowski (@wojespn) September 28, 2017
Looking at the odds for a team to move into the top three in the draft, notice that the previous odds in parenthesis scaled dramatically upward the more a team lost. This created the “race to the bottom” incentive since losses could lead to increased odds of landing a franchise-altering player. The new odds are “flattened,” meaning the four worst teams have nearly identical odds while odds for teams in the middle of the lottery have dramatically increased. Teams eight through 11 had their odds of moving into the top three roughly doubled.
As a consequence, teams no longer need to plan their way into one of the league’s worst records to optimize lottery odds. Previously, the team with the fifth-worst record had less than half the chance of landing a top-three pick compared to the team with the worst record. Under the new system, the teams with the fifth- and sixth-worst records have odds that are about 75 percent as good as the worst team. If you’re the team with the 11th-worst record at the trade deadline, are you a buyer hoping to move up a few places and make the playoffs? Or do you trade away assets and possibly waive valuable players that are not in your team’s long-term plans to chase lottery odds that are more evenly distributed starting in 2019?
By flattening the odds, the NBA has distributed the chances for a team to luck into a top-three pick — and potentially a generational star — to be more favorable for a larger number of teams. And that’s why further steps at lottery reform will be extremely difficult to pass. As we take a look below at potential additional steps, a common theme will emerge. These steps could further dis-incentivize losing, but they’re all unlikely to pass because they would restrict access to high picks that could potentially land a superstar.
The “no repeater” rule
ESPN’s Zach Lowe reported after the league’s previous lottery reform proposal was voted down that many teams didn’t like it when the Cavaliers won the top overall pick in three out of four drafts. To avoid a repeat of the “insta-rebuild” the Cavaliers were able to execute, one change contemplated for the latest round of reform — but which did not make it into the proposal that was recently voted on and adopted — was a rule restricting teams from moving up in the draft in consecutive seasons. Such a rule would have prevented the Cavaliers from picking first in the draft more frequently than every other season.
While this rule would further discourage teams from bottoming out — since remaining bad for multiple years wouldn’t be rewarded with consecutive chances at the top pick in the draft — the reason the rule didn’t make it to a vote should be fairly obvious. NBA teams would love to restrict other teams from access to superstars, but they don’t want that access restricted for themselves if misfortune dooms them to multiple trips to the lottery. This could be why the Oklahoma City Thunder were the only organization to vote against the latest reform proposal. Thunder GM Sam Presti had so much success drafting high in the lottery — selecting Kevin Durant, Russell Westbrook and James Harden in successive years — that the Thunder may have wished to avoid any restrictions on Presti repeating that success the next time it needs to rebuild.
The postseason consolation tournament
The surest way to ensure that draft position is not based solely on losing would be a postseason tournament for teams that miss the playoffs that provides an opportunity to move up by advancing. Basketball Insiders previously proposed a tournament involving a home-and-home series for each round with the winner advancing based on aggregate points. For each round a team won, it would move up one position in the draft. Thus, if a team was in position to select first prior to the tournament, it would have to win at least one round to ensure that another team didn’t move ahead of it.
This idea would drive massive interest and generate massive revenue for the NBA, two factors that would normally spur a profit-driven league to take notice. But a consolation tournament in any form is unlikely for the same reason as the “no repeater” rule. Teams can talk until they’re blue in the face about taking away the incentive to tank, but the moment you propose a rule that would take away some of the control teams have over their own draft position, the interest will wane.
Since the incentive to obtain superstar players is much greater than the incentive to prevent other teams from tanking, teams are likely to remain much more interested in improving their own odds than in making the system “fair.” A consolation tournament would drive new behaviors aimed at improving a team’s competitiveness at the end of the season. Players that are waived or bought out at the trade deadline would suddenly be in line for a financial windfall since teams would be motivated to lose for most of the season but become more competitive right at the end. That could create just as much of a PR nightmare for the league as tanking does currently.
A three-tiered lottery system
The only system that has been proposed that would eliminate any incentive to tank out of a low playoff seed is a three-tiered lottery system. Under this proposal, there would be a lottery tier composed of teams that have a chance to move up in the draft, a playoff tier composed of teams that are excluded from the lottery, and a randomly-sized middle tier that is also excluded. By randomizing the number of teams that are allowed to take part in the lottery, it would make it impossible for teams to plan their way into the lottery. If a team doesn’t know how far it has to drop in the standings to get into the lottery, it would be much less likely to tank out of a low playoff seed.
The flaw with this proposal is the same as the others. To implement a three-tiered system, teams would have to vote in favor of reducing the number of teams that get to participate in the lottery. This rule is the ultimate answer to tanking, but a team is unlikely to vote for any proposal that could hurt its own chances.
The NBA has said that the latest round of reforms is only an incremental step, but it’s hard to imagine further steps that would be attractive enough to lead to implementation. What’s far more likely is that the latest reform is how the lottery system will remain for years to come as teams assess its impact. The impetus for future change will likely result from unintended consequences of the latest lottery reform, which won’t be understood for years. While we wait for that understanding to develop, don’t expect much in the way of additional lottery reform.
NBA Daily: The Stretch Run – Pacific Division
Matt John starts off Basketball Insiders’ The Stretch Run by taking a look at the Pacific Division franchises on the playoff bubble.
Well, well, well . . . we’re now entering the home stretch here, people. With the All-Star break nearing its end, the regular season stakes will intensify exponentially. The losses count for far more now than they did a month ago. The playoff seedings are starting to settle a bit and we’re starting to see a playoff bubble in our midst.
With that in mind, Basketball Insiders would like to introduce a new series titled The Stretch Run. In these pieces, we’ll be looking at the teams from each division to evaluate their ever-growing bubble and the chances of reaching the postseason. Keep in mind, of course, that this analysis is based on the standings as of now. Needless to say, a whole bunch can change in the 25-and-change games that are left.
Today we’re diving into the Pacific Division — or, otherwise known as the top-heavy division.
There are other top-heavy divisions in the NBA at the moment — just look at the Central — but the Pacific Division is the much polarizing of them all. The best teams in the division currently sport two of the top three records in the Western Conference. The other three? Unfortunately, they hold three of the four worst records in the Western Conference.
So let’s just get this out of the way: Neither Los Angeles-based team is on the bubble. Barring a major meltdown — which is not likely when you have the likes of LeBron James, Kawhi Leonard, Anthony Davis and Paul George on your squad — both the Lakers and the Clippers are most definitely making the playoffs.
There’s not much cause for concern since both are expected to make deep postseason runs — although you never know with injuries. At this point, however, the franchises may too deep to worry about breaking down, but it’s still worth mentioning. According to Tankathon as of Feb. 18, the Lakers and Clippers have two of the league’s 10 easiest schedules from here on out, so all that has gone well should end well.
As for their other Pacific Division compatriots, well, those three are obviously in different places.
Just to tie up any loose ends before diving in, the Golden State Warriors are out, too. And they’ve probably been out since the day Stephen Curry broke his hand. To recap: The Warriors have the worst record in the league; currently trail behind Memphis by 16.5 games for the No. 8 seed with 27 contests left; Curry’s not expected back until March at the earliest. Hell, when Klay Thompson will make his season debut? Or, better yet, who knows if Klay Thompson will make his season debut at all?
The postseason boat has sailed for the boys in the Bay Area. After back-to-back-to-back-to-back-to-back runs to the NBA Finals, the gang needed a chance to catch their breath. If Curry and Thompson both make it back before season’s end, we’ll get a brief glimpse of Golden State’s new big three plus Andrew Wiggins. That doesn’t breed excitement as much as it breeds intrigue.
Thanks to the updated lottery rules, Golden State can compete at full strength without endangering their odds. Even better, don’t forget that high pick in the upcoming 2020 NBA Draft. The perennial contenders may have had a downer season but, in the long run, this may have been the best route for them.
Therein lies the Phoenix Suns and Sacramento Kings. Any postseason hopes are dim but all hope is not lost. First off, although both combine for two of the four aforementioned worst records in the conference, take it with a major grain of salt. They are currently No. 12 and No. 13 in the conference but the Suns are behind the Portland Trail Blazers by only three games for ninth, while the Kings lag the Blazers by only half a game more.
The hard part, however, is that Phoenix and Sacramento are both well behind the Memphis Grizzlies for the No. 8 seed — 6.5 and 7 games, respectively.
Again, though, all hope is not lost for them. At least, not entirely as the Grizzlies will have the toughest schedule for the rest of the season. Out of their final 28 games, Memphis faces 16 teams over .500, while 18 of them are against tougher Western Conference foes. Getting past them is doable, but they would have to leapfrog Portland, San Antonio and New Orleans in the process.
But who is more likely to complete that feat?
If we’re comparing their strength of schedule, it’s Sacramento. The Kings have the 10th-easiest schedule from here on out. Even though they’re facing 18 Western Conference teams of their own over the last 28 games, only 13 are against those over .500.
Phoenix, by contrast, has the eighth-hardest remaining. They may have fewer games in which they face Western Conference opponents — which could work against them seeing how head-to-head record impacts conference standing — but they also play more teams over .500 than Sacramento (15).
The Suns have a half-game lead over the Kings, but the Kings have an easier path ahead opponent-wise.
Unfortunately for both, the franchise with the easiest schedule for the remainder of the season appears to be the young and frightening New Orleans Pelicans. The Pelicans are starting to look like the dangerous sleeper we all thought they’d be now that Zion Williamson has arrived.
Sadly, that could spell doom for the Suns’ and Kings’ playoff hopes,
Both teams have been decimated by player absences — and pretty much from the beginning too. Phoenix lost Deandre Ayton literally one game into the year due to a suspension. Sacramento ended up missing De’Aaron Fox for a long stretch because of an early ankle sprain.
And even though those were the most prominent injuries, they’ve dealt with several others as well. Aron Baynes hasn’t played in a month, while it may be a while longer before Richaun Holmes takes the court again. Even Marvin Bagley III has struggled to stay on the court for most of the season.
As for how they compare for how they’ve done, there’s more evidence supporting Phoenix as the better team between the two, but only slightly. Phoenix has both a better point differential — minus-1.2 to minus-2.9 — and net rating — minus-0.9 to minus-2.6 — than Sacramento does. The Suns are not in a league above the Kings in either area, but the statistical differences would show that the former has played marginally better.
In the end, Sacramento entered this season with much higher expectations following the franchise’s most productive effort since 2006. On the other hand, Phoenix came into this season with the same small-level outlook they’ve held for quite some time.
So even though the Suns have exceeded expectations and the Kings have fallen well short, the two sides find themselves virtually tied.
Given the deep holes they’ve dug themselves heading toward March, however, it seems more than likely that the Suns and Kings will be spending the playoffs from their couches.
At this point, both franchises are in a newly-found position of promise but that still does not guarantee a postseason berth. Despite the valiant efforts, Phoenix and Sacramento will have the same closing remark when the season closes out: Better luck next year.
NBA Daily: In Context: The Elam Ending & The 2019 NBA Finals
The “Elam Ending” brought more excitement to the NBA All-Star Game, but how would it affect games that matter most? Douglas Farmer takes a look at the 2019 NBA Finals through the Elam lens.
For all those bothered that Sunday’s All-Star Game ended on a free throw, let’s not remind them of the 2019 NBA Finals. Let’s not remember that — with less than a second remaining on the clock — Kawhi Leonard hit three free throws to turn a one-point lead into a four-point victory and a Toronto Raptors-winning championship.
Of course, if the “Elam Ending” had been in place for that Game 6, some different choices would have been made. That disclaimer aside, Leonard’s final free throw gave the Raptors what would likely have been the target score in that hypothetical. In fact, four of the six NBA Finals games ended on the likely target scores, anyway, while the other two never reached it.
Before walking through those scenarios, a quick description of the Elam Ending for those who did not follow Sunday’s exhibition: With a predetermined amount of time remaining, the clock is turned off; the game ends when a team reaches a “target score” established by adding a set number of points to the leading team’s score when the clock turns off. In the All-Star Game, the clock turned off for the entire fourth quarter, adding 24 points — a Kobe Bryant tribute — to the leading team’s score. For a more practical setting, it would be far less time and far fewer points.
Developed by a University of Dayton professor, Nick Elam, the well-named Elam Ending — which has been featured in the enormously-popular The Basketball Tournament over the last few years — adds eight points to the leading score at the first dead ball after the four-minute mark. If used in the NBA, Elam has suggested adding seven points at the last media timeout, coming at the first dead ball after the three-minute mark.
His rationale for seven stems from dividing typical full-game scoring rates by 16, but that fails to factor in late-game urgency and the inherent skewing to such a sample size. In short, the first three minutes will have less average scoring than the last three minutes simply because a bucket at the 2:59 mark is more likely than one a second into the game, not to mention a shot at 0:01 is more likely than one at 9:01.
Talked about this with Professor Elam and he made the point that starting the “ending” portion too early will wear everyone out, which is why his proposal is add 7 to high score at first stoppage under 3 minutes. https://t.co/GndXjOhyRz
— Anchorage Man (@SethPartnow) February 17, 2020
Thus, many have settled on eight — potentially another Kobe Bryant tribute — as the likely additional number if ever considered in the NBA. While the ending intends to remove any logic to intentionally fouling in late-game situations and thus preserving a truer state of the game we love, its effects go much further into strategy, lineup rotations and redefining the idea of “clutch.”
What it does not do, however, is shorten the game, at least in terms of points, as many incorrectly assume it does. Consider last year’s NBA Finals …
GAME 1: Raptors win, 118-109
First off, if we are to use the All-Star Game version of this drama-inducing ending, only two of the six Finals games would have reached the third quarter-dependent target score. Playoff games grind through the fourth quarter — but again, that was a gimmick for the exhibition contest. Any practical usage would have included a shorter ending.
The first dead ball after the three-minute mark in Game 1 came at the 2:35 mark with the Raptors leading 110-101, just after a Stephen Curry three-point play. Adding eight points to that 110 gives the final winning total, a number reached when Toronto guard Kyle Lowry hit a 28-foot three-pointer with 30 seconds left. At that point, it was essentially considered icing on the cake, turning a 115-106 lead into a 12-point margin — but in this theoretical, it would have been the game-winning shot.
Any 28-footer is dramatic, but that would have been quite the scene to start the Finals.
GAME 2: Warriors win, 109-104
The final minutes of this became a slog, so a more inspired conclusion would have been appreciated by all. A total of 3:18 passed between buckets from the 4:26 mark to the 1:08, keeping the score at 106-98 at the needed dead ball. Golden State added only an Andre Iguodala three-pointer with seven seconds remaining to stymie a Toronto charge that would’ve brought them within two. If the Warriors had needed to get to 114, it seems borderline-likely the Raptors would have pulled off the win and swept the series, considering that those were the only points Golden State scored in the final 5:39.
GAME 3: Raptors win, 123-109
Toronto led 115-103 at the last media timeout, while a Marc Gasol three made it 121-107 with 1:07 left before a Pascal Siakam layup reached the possible target score with a 14-point lead. Golden State was not coming back, so an Elam Ending would have at least expedited the ending. Jacob Evans may have been most appreciative of that as he missed two field-goal attempts after Siakam’s decisive points. Regardless, not much in the way of drama here.
GAME 4: Raptors win, 105-92
Again, it is hard to envision the Elam Ending changing much about this game — even with the inherent strategic shifts to it. Toronto led 99-89 with 2:48 left, but neither team exactly stressed in the final minutes. Curry turned a three-point play and the Raptors hit a trio of mid-range jumpers. Toronto did not reach the presumed 107 target score, but another mid-range shot from Siakam — who hit two of the aforementioned three — would not have taken long, and Golden State would not have rattled off 15 points before he hit it.
Both in real life and in this exercise, this blowout was the point in the series everyone began to realize what the Raptors really were about to do.
GAME 5: Raptors win, 106-105
As much as the Elam Ending was designed to eliminate an influx of free throws, it also puts an impetus on making shots. That might not sound revolutionary but, as often as not, games are determined by misses. Toronto led Game 5 by a score of 103-97 at the 2:59 mark when Draymond Green fouled Leonard. From that point on, the Raptors went 1-of-6 from the field.
Sure, Golden State hit a trio of three-pointers to take the lead and the game, while the Raptors struggled to get the ball anywhere near the hoop. But as impressive as the Warriors’ barrage was, wouldn’t everyone have preferred Curry or Klay Thompson to hit two more and break 111?
NBA, change the rules, make every fourth quarter like that fourth quarter…
— Bill Plaschke (@BillPlaschke) February 17, 2020
GAME 6: Raptors win, 114-110, and clinch the series
Here is where the Elam Ending would have provided a championship-worthy moment. In literal terms, Leonard’s three free throws with hardly any time remaining gave Toronto the 114 target score necessitated by a 106-101 lead at the 2:49 mark. For practicality, Golden State probably would not have melted down with back-to-back technical and personal fouls when they collectively realized a full-court, miracle three-pointer would be needed to win the game.
Instead, Iguodala would not have fouled Leonard at all — let alone earned the technical. The Raptors would have clung to a one-point lead, needing just three more to win the title.
The Elam Ending does not bring about the end of the game any faster in basketball terms — in real-time, though, the dearth of fouls unquestionably speeds things up — but it largely brings the dramatic moments we remember.
Of course, Anthony Davis’ clinching free throw was not all that abnormal.
Still, in the context of a recently-thrilling NBA Finals, it’s easy to see why the Elam Ending has people hyped to talk about basketball nuances again — naturally, however, it does not guarantee drama.
NBA Daily: Russell Westbrook — Full Throttle
When Houston traded for Russell Westbrook last summer, they had to embrace him, warts and all. Matt John goes into what the Rockets have done to achieve just that and how their most recent deals could net them the most efficient Westbrook they could’ve hoped for.
Russell Westbrook doesn’t care what you call him, whether a high-usage, low-efficiency chucker, an anti-spacer that clogs the lane, or an empty stat-chaser. To Westbrook, it’s all the same: noise, especially if you are focused on Basketball Betting.
And, no matter what you may think of him, nothing is stopping Westbrook from playing at his own pace: fast (to say the least).
Westbrook’s style is so lively, so twitchy, that it’s hard not to it in just about everything he does on the court. While it’s certainly contributed to many of his flaws, the aggression he’s played with, the bounce in his step, has helped him rack up the accolades and eye-popping stats that he has throughout his career.
As a basketball player, Westbrook is the quintessential perfect storm; a tornado of fire, accolades and counting stats.
But because his warts — his sans-Kevin Durant postseason success, his paltry shooting numbers (particularly this season) — are as obvious as his talent, nobody seemed enthralled when it was announced that Westbrook was set to rejoin James Harden, this time with the Houston Rockets. Dating back to Kevin Garnett and Shaquille O’Neal in 2010, there has arguably never been as little fanfare concerning two former MVPs joining forces.
There was one silver lining, however: in his new home, Westbrook would be surrounded by shooters. Better yet, shooters that would prove consistently reliable on the defensive end. In Houston, Westbrook wouldn’t have to be Mr. Do It All. But would it be enough?
No was the early, and loud, return. Through the season’s first two months, the Rockets were 23-11, a strong record, no doubt. But fans couldn’t help but wonder if Westbrook had helped, or hurt, their cause. By New Year’s Eve, Houston was plus-3.9 with Westbrook on the floor, but were somehow better — plus–9.5 — with him off.
The Rockets may have managed with Westbrook, but he wasn’t making them better. Of course, in that time, Westbrook had carried his weight as Houston’s no. 2 — 24.2 points and 7.1 assists — but his efficiency was as bad as it had ever been, if not worse. His 43/23/80 splits, while also coughing the ball up 4.4 times a game, had Rockets fans in shambles, the 23 percent from three-point range especially glaring as Westbrook was taking nearly five a game.
Making matters worse, Chris Paul, whom Daryl Morey traded for Westbrook, was not-so-quietly having his healthiest, most productive season since 2016 with the upstart Oklahoma City Thunder. On top of Westbrook’s struggles, Paul’s resurgence made it seem as if Morey had made a terrible mistake.
But, Westbrook seemed to turn a corner in the new year. In January, he averaged 32.5 points on 52/25/76 splits, while the Rockets were plus-2.5 with him on the court and minus-0.9 with him off. While that was an improvement, Houston went 7-7, though Westbrook missed four of those games. Even if he was technically better, he still served as the scapegoat.
Something was holding both the Rockets and Westbrook back.
That something, in Westbook’s case, was the Rockets. Morey and Co. had asked Westbrook to play their style, which meant spot-up threes — not exactly Westbrook’s forte — and a slower pace. In essence, it was the complete antithesis of Westbrook. In time, it became clear that, if Morey’s experiment was ever going to work, Houston would have to adapt to Westbrook, not the other way around.
And, because Morey would do anything and everything in his power to win, the Rockets did just that. By trading Clint Capela, who, while a young, proven and still promising big, was a poor fit with Westbrook, for Robert Covington, Houston embraced small-ball and, in turn, embraced Westbrook’s ability and game to the fullest extent.
Relying on Covington, Danuel House Jr and PJ Tucker to hold their own against much bigger frontcourts will be an interesting sight come playoff time. And trading Capela — a young, high-upside and cost-controlled big — is certainly a gamble. But this version of the Rockets may arguably be the closest thing we ever see to the “perfect team” around Westbrook, and it may just be Houston’s best bet to win a title.
Now, the lane is completely free. Westbrook will be playing with shooters virtually non-stop. That means fewer threes on his part, driving to the basket with no one to get in his way, opening up more room for those shooters. And, while Westbrook’s perfect team does not equate to the perfect team period, it could equate to a deeper playoff run.
Since Houston’s shift, the returns have been promising. Post-Capela (his last appearance was Jan. 29), Houston has played six games and gone 4-2. And, minus their stinker against Phoenix, another game in which Westbrook did not play, each of those games has provided ample proof that an entire small-ball squad can be viable. Houston came out the victor against two of the best teams in the NBA this season, the Los Angeles Lakers and Boston Celtics, and another team with plenty of size, the New Orleans Pelicans.
The Rockets have also averaged 115.9 points per game, while Westbrook has led the team with 34 points per game and shot 51.5 percent from the field. So, in other words, he’s being efficient. Just don’t ask about his three-point shooting.
A “sample size” disclaimer will probably haunt the Rockets between now and the postseason, but the headline here is that thus far, it’s working. It’s not all because of Westbrook — through this stretch, Houston has been a plus-0.9 when Westbrook’s hit the bench — but he’s not hurting them as he did before.
In due time, we’ll see if Morey’s latest experimental maneuvering will pay off. But it’s clear that, if they go down, they’ll go down with Westbrook, rather than against him. They’ll be confident for sure, because, come the postseason, Westbrook will hit the court as he always has: full throttle.