The term “gravity” in basketball may have been born of analytically-inclined thinking, but at its core it speaks to one of the simplest basketball themes imaginable. In the broadest possible sense, gravity is really just any force that helps pull the defense to a certain place – from the offense’s perspective, hopefully to a place that proves undesirable for defending and makes it easier to score.
To watch the modern NBA, and particularly some of the most potent offenses in the game, you’d assume this kind of basic understanding has been present for decades.
Teams like the Golden State Warriors and San Antonio Spurs base much of their offensive philosophy around manufacturing ball and player movements that will force certain reactions from the defense, then exploiting those reactions. They beautifully leverage the all-world talents of their players; just when the opposition thinks they’ve found the formula, the best of them have organic counters in place to keep them guessing. Watching one of these elite teams, it feels almost laughable to go about playing offense in basketball any other way.
Curiously enough, though, this hasn’t been anywhere close to the norm for the vast majority of the game’s history. NBA basketball has spent easily the largest chunk of its existence as a game based around mismatches and individual dominance, and huge elements of this approach still pervade the league today. My guy is simply more talented than your guy, the thinking goes; you’re either going to have to bring your guy some help while opening things up for someone else on my team, or I’m going to keep pushing that edge.
This isn’t to say there was no teamwork in prior decades of NBA basketball, or even that those approaches were necessarily bad. As recently as 10 years ago, though, the full power of ball and player movement – from all five guys, not just one or two involved in a given play – wasn’t really understood.
And then along came a guy named Mike D’Antoni.
As a player in his youth, D’Antoni was part of the formative era of modern basketball. He played in both the American Basketball Association (ABA) and the early NBA during the mid-70s, a period where the ABA was pioneering the use of the three-point line. The NBA wouldn’t adopt the three until 1979, by which time D’Antoni was well into a successful playing career in Europe.
During his American playing days, D’Antoni took note of the way coaches and teams reacted to big structural changes like the three-point line – it was “willy-nilly a little bit,” he says now of the response he saw. Like with any big rule change, it took time for the league’s collective understanding to build about the best ways to exploit the new rules. He saw more of the same once the NBA adopted a three-point line.
D’Antoni made the transition from player to coach in the early 90s, beginning overseas. He hadn’t forgotten the impression those old ABA days had made on him. On top of that, he was influenced by one of the most popular teams in history to that point, the Showtime Lakers – not Magic’s flash or Kareem’s quiet dominance, but rather the raw speed with which the Lakers ran their opponents ragged. The seeds of NBA evolution were being planted.
After some stops in personnel and broadcasting plus a few assistant jobs, D’Antoni was hired by the Phoenix Suns in 2002 as an assistant. Partway into the 2003-04 season, he was promoted to head coach. What would follow would have more of an impact on the NBA and basketball as we know it than anyone could have predicted.
We talked earlier about gravity as simply a fancy term for an intuitive NBA concept, and D’Antoni’s offense was the perfect example. Even as they pushed movement and spacing themes harder than anyone in the world had to that point, they weren’t thinking in those sort of terms.
“I’m not sure I ever heard the term ‘gravity’ used,” says Doug Eberhardt, a part time assistant coach and longtime confidant of D’Antoni.
Defining the word in the way it’s used in today’s game, though, is exactly what D’Antoni and his group were getting at.
“You can use all the terminology you want – ‘gravity,’ whatever you want to call it,” D’Antoni tells Basketball Insiders today. “What we just try to do offensively is take all the rules defensively, and go against them… Everything that they preach defensively, we try to do [the] opposite or try and get to a spot they don’t want to be in.”
To accomplish this, D’Antoni drew from his influences: The way Magic and his Lakers kept teams off balance with nothing but sheer speed and decisiveness; the way the entire league was still digesting and processing what the three-pointer was good for.
His system was a hybrid of these ideas, and of other styles. D’Antoni was far from the first to involve multiple players in a given action or use the theme of movement to burn the defense; think of Jerry Sloan’s use of the pick-and-roll in the 90s, for instance.
D’Antoni was, however, one of the very first to realize a concept that seems like grade school stuff to most league thinkers now: If ball and player movement have so much success pulling the defense to places where the offense prefers them, then think about how successful the O could be if the D was never in the right place to begin with.
With that theme in mind, the Seven Seconds or Less Suns were born.
Under D’Antoni, the goal is simple: Put the defense to impossible decisions. Using any and all means necessary, every second spent with the ball in D’Antoni’s system is one where players should be finding opportunities to create two-on-ones that force the opposition to decide between the lesser of two evils.
Much of the foundation for this is in the transition game, which at the time was virtually uncharted territory around the league. Sure, teams would run out on the break if they got a steal up at the top of the key and an easy numbers advantage, or if a rebound bounced long into the perfect place. A few even pushed it further. The majority of NBA offense, though, was played in a set, halfcourt format.
D’Antoni made running the break a cornerstone of his system, and flipped the league’s transition principles on their heads while doing it.
“What’s the natural reaction of the defense when you’re in any transition? You’ve been taught since you’re little that you run to the basket, and protect from the basket out,” Eberhardt says.
Not against D’Antoni’s Suns, you don’t.
“On transition [defense], they want to run back into the paint and pack,” D’Antoni says. “Well, then we’re going to shoot threes.”
Instead of running to the basket in transition, bigs were told to stay outside and keep the lane clear for cutters. Instead of hitting the free-throw line extended and cutting inside for a possible layup or dunk, wings were taught to space directly to the corners – the furthest distance away from where the defense naturally wanted to run. Once teams adjusted to that? Hit them with the counter.
“They don’t want to be out hugging the three, because then you give up layups,” D’Antoni says. “They don’t want to be not giving up layups, because then you’re giving up threes. We’re trying to make it so where they have no choice but to not have an answer.”
They may not have been using the term, but think back to our broad definition of gravity – isn’t that exactly what it’s getting at? The fast break is the easiest way to force a defense into a numbers disadvantage; a numbers disadvantage is the easiest way to force the defense into a decision with no good answers. As Eberhardt puts it: “The gravity comes when you realize who the guy is that you have to cover.”
At first, things may have been a tough sell. Not only were D’Antoni and his staff preaching new concepts, they were the type that required both a physical and a mental commitment. Guys were running more than they ever had before, and while they did it they were being asked to remember principles that ran directly contrary to what many had learned coming up.
Superstar Steve Nash quickly bought in, something D’Antoni credits to this day for helping bring things along. But he readily admits the idea wasn’t universally popular – even certain assistants on his own staff were doubtful.
It’s much harder to argue with results, though, as he quickly found out. In his first full season at the helm, the Suns started a blistering 31-4. They averaged an unbelievable 110 points per game during this stretch, a mark they’d maintain for the full season while just five of the 29 other teams in the league would even crack 100.
“It made it an easy sell at that point,” D’Antoni reflects. “‘Hey, this works.’ And then the players were excited, all of them were averaging career-highs and stuff. So it sold itself in that sense.”
When the pure transition opportunities weren’t there, the layers of D’Antoni’s offense kicked in. The Suns’ secondary transition game may have been just as vital to their success as the actual fast breaks themselves, in fact – they actually never led the league in fast break point metrics, a distinction that was always reserved for the Nuggets and their high altitude back then.
With most other teams at that point, though, a fast break that didn’t materialize led to a reset, then a halfcourt play. For the Suns, there was no reset. The speed and decisiveness of the offense continued to flow.
A big piece of this secondary transition was the drag screen, or a pick the big man sets immediately upon entering the halfcourt (remember, D’Antoni’s bigs were told to stay out of the lane in transition to keep space open). Instead of coming up from behind or to the side of his target from his post down inside the paint, the big man would run the floor and, if the Suns’ transition attack hadn’t already generated a bucket, he would often immediately set a high pick for Nash or another ball-handler before ever entering the key.
Once again, the prevailing theme is keeping the defense off balance. Imagine you’re Nash’s defender, and you’ve just sprinted back down the court and narrowly prevented an easy look in transition. You don’t get a rest: Boom, before you’ve even set yourself and found everyone’s place on the court, you’re running into a seven-footer’s chest and Nash is walking into another deadly two-on-one.
Teams just weren’t ready for this sort of decisiveness. The Suns were playing at a speed that’s fast even for today’s game, which has mostly incorporated D’Antoni’s transition principles – per the tracking site inpredictable.com, they averaged a league-low 13.5 seconds elapsed per offensive possession in 2004-05. That’s a big difference from the league average of 14.8 seconds in 2016-17 and actually dead even with the 16-17 Warriors, the league’s fastest offensive team. If it wasn’t the fast break itself that killed you, it was the secondary action that flowed directly from it.
Even the possessions that mostly resembled traditional NBA halfcourt sets were littered with bits of D’Antoni’s dogma. He ran startlingly few actual diagrammed plays, with a much larger emphasis on the kind of heady “flow” that’s become more and more popular today.
“In the old NBA, a lot of times you just called plays out like, ‘Okay, we’ll call 44 because it’s time John touches the ball,’ or ‘Now we’re going to run 65,’” D’Antoni says now. “How that became the old NBA mantra – I hated that. Players would say, ‘I’m not getting any touches.’ I hate that.
“By having energy, we would tell the guys: ‘If you have energy, you run the floor, you cut at the right times, all that, the ball will find you and you’ll have a career-high.’”
D’Antoni’s battle cry in the locker room while hammering home these principles was simple: “The ball will find energy.” He didn’t teach plays; he taught concepts, then he trusted the best in the world at their craft to execute them.
One such concept is the “bottom-side screen.” Big men in pick-and-roll plays have their own form of gravity – the way they roll to the hoop, the threat of the lob or the layup, and perhaps most importantly in D’Antoni’s eyes, the way they set their screens.
“We really emphasize the energy that the big puts in the last three steps going into a pick-and-roll,” D’Antoni says of a screening scheme that continues to this day. “Where he hits the defense on the pick-and-roll – it has to be the bottom side. You want the defense to go over the top and start chasing the point guard.”
What happens when the defense goes over? You guessed it, another two-on-one. More decisions for the defense, and no great answers. “We’ve got guys good enough that it’s, ‘Once you give me a half-step, I’m taking it. I’m gone,’” D’Antoni says.
The emphasis on screen-setting was never about the action itself. Rather, it was about the speed, the precision and the ultimate result of what you were being asked to do – how your pick spatially influenced the defenders in the play to the benefit of the offense.
“The old sayings, you know, ‘Hold your pick, hit the guy,’ all that – we tried to discourage [that],” D’Antoni tells me. “We put more emphasis and more premium on, how do you get into the pick? The speed. How fast do you get out of the pick? And then the angle that you set it.”
As D’Antoni moved through further coaching spots over the years on his way to his current job in Houston, these kinds of little details became more important to maintain an edge. The NBA has long been a copycat league, and others had quickly begun to pick some of the lowest-hanging fruit from D’Antoni’s general theme. Teams ran in transition a bit more opportunistically, looking for chances to catch the defense off-balance. When they played a D’Antoni squad, they were more prepared for what was coming.
The exploits became more granular, but they were still there – and they still all traced back to that theme of gravity.
For instance, D’Antoni has often asked that his spot-up shooters spacing the floor do so from several feet behind the three-point line, rather than just a step or two back. The league took notice during his first year in Houston when guys like Eric Gordon and Ryan Anderson would almost comically exaggerate the gap, but it was actually a well-practiced D’Antoni staple from years prior.
“The original reason Mike wanted them to stop up in that area was so they had the opportunity to catch and step in,” Eberhardt says. When guys like Gordon and Anderson, who can simply make those deep shots at a high clip without stepping in, are on the floor, it’s an even bigger edge. “It makes a huge impact, because the defense has that couple extra steps they now have to close out.”
Another scheme that was present in earlier iterations but really gained steam in Houston is the super-high screen. A common tactic for slowing the D’Antoni transition machine quickly became opponents pressing Nash or other ball-handlers further up the court to disrupt their pace, often a halfcourt press or even further.
When that happened, D’Antoni simply had his screening big come way further out beyond the key to set the pick, even as far as halfcourt. A two-on-one is still a two-on-one no matter where it is on the court, and it’s still going to force exploitable rotations from the defense. Virtually any defense silly enough to press up on James Harden in Houston today is going to get this treatment, and chances are Harden is going to use those couple extra steps to make them pay for it. Even when a team isn’t pressing, the Rockets will sometimes intentionally run high pick-and-rolls that start even further up the floor to give Harden a bigger runway. None of this is going away with Chris Paul, already an elite practitioner of the super-high screen, now in the fold.
Finally, of course, there’s the raw volume of threes being taken in D’Antoni’s offense. His Phoenix squads always took plenty, but perhaps weren’t the outlier many remember: They were actually only first in per-possession three-point attempts twice in his four full years with the Suns, and even these years were by relatively thin margins.
Fast forward to today, and the gap between D’Antoni and everyone else is much larger. His Rockets attempted an incredible 39 threes per-100-possessions for the 2016-17 season, miles ahead of second-place Cleveland at just 34. The Warriors are virtually synonymous with the three in today’s game, but Houston took nearly 33 percent more attempts than them on a per-possession basis.
To hear Eberhardt tell it, though, those same Warriors may have simply galvanized D’Antoni to realize the true destiny of his offensive approach.
“Even a coach like that has second thoughts,” Eberhardt says. It’s easy to second-guess yourself when even your own assistants are doubting you. “[But] with Golden State winning and how the league was bending to his philosophy, now he’s gone full-throttle shooting the three.”
True to form, this isn’t an adjustment where just one part of the equation is considered. Three is more than two, but that’s not the only reason D’Antoni is again the league’s biggest outlier in an important area. Once again, he’s exploiting what he knows the defense’s expectations will be.
Just one NBA team in 2016-17 was in the league’s top five for both shots attempted at the rim and conversion percentage on these shots: The Rockets. And while the credit here often falls to longtime GM Daryl Morey and his Moreyball approach that totally cuts out midrange shots, this interplay is another D’Antoni mainstay.
Think about the trickle-down effect of some of what we’ve talked about: Guys spacing out to several feet beyond the three-point line, then actually making shots from there; D’Antoni’s team firing away threes at a ridiculous rate even for a league that’s historically obsessed with them; wings spacing out to the corner three in transition, rather than running for layups. As a defender going against this attack, what kind of effect does that create?
If you said gravity, good work. All that emphasis on threes and extreme versions of spacing will get you some points organically, sure, but more than that, they’ll pull the defense further from the hoop. What D’Antoni was doing with his seemingly ass-backwards transition spacing in Phoenix a decade ago is now working in reverse – teams are so conditioned to track his team’s threes that they’re willing to leave the vital real estate near the basket wide open.
Another day, another impossible decision for a team facing Mike D’Antoni’s offense. His players won’t always make the shots, of course, and they may not even make the right decisions about which shots to take.
But in a game with thousands and thousands of offensive possessions every year, gravity’s pull starts to make a real difference. No basketball mind has more thoroughly plumbed the depths of this concept, or done so with as much success. You’ll forgive D’Antoni for a singular, fleeting moment of bravado.
“Somebody’s going to be open,” D’Antoni tells me. “If you [do] it right, somebody’s going to be open. We don’t always get it right in a sense of picking out the right guy. But I truly believe: You cannot guard it. Period.”
NBA Daily: Are Stephen Curry, Draymond Green Enough To Keep Warriors Afloat?
Steph Curry and Draymond Green are one of the NBA’s most accomplished duos ever. Still, they might not be good enough to take the rebuilt Warriors back to the playoffs, says Jack Winter.
Advanced statistics, maybe even more than the gleam of multiple championship rings and Larry O’Brien trophies, suggest that Stephen Curry and Draymond Green are among the NBA’s most dominant pair of teammates ever.
The Warriors won three championships from 2014-15 to 2018-19. They played in the NBA Finals every June, and combined to win 322 regular season games – by far the most in league history over any five-year span. Even that all-time level of success still doesn’t quite portray just how close Golden State was to winning a mind-bending five straight titles. Luck always affects the championship picture, but the Warriors – with Green’s one-game suspension midway through the 2016 Finals and separate injuries to Kevin Durant and Klay Thompson last spring – were almost the last team standing for a half-decade running regardless.
Curry and Green, certainly before Durant arrived and even for the past three seasons, were the driving forces behind Golden State’s dynasty. Everything the Warriors did on both ends stemmed from the singular influence provided by the most imminently-threatening shooter of all time and a defensive chameleon the likes of which the league had never seen. Steve Kerr deserves immense credit for the implementation and execution of his team’s ballyhooed two-way concepts, but he’s the first to acknowledge that its unique style of play was built on the backs of Curry and Green.
The same will hold true in 2019-20. The Warriors, in fact, are poised to ask more of Curry and Green this season than ever, a development the numbers indicate should lead to sustained success despite a re-made, underwhelming roster that won’t include Thompson until March at the absolute earliest, if he comes back at all.
Curry and Green posted a +15.2 net rating last season, the league’s third-best mark behind duos that included each of them and Durant. They had the 12th-best net rating in 2017-18, when Curry missed 31 games with an ankle injury, and ranked top-eight in that regard during each of the previous three seasons. No other tandem in basketball boasts a higher average net rating since 2014-15 than Curry and Green’s +16.5.
Obviously, Curry and Green don’t account for that unparalleled level of on-court success all by themselves. Duos including Durant, Thompson, Andre Iguodala, and even Zaza Pachulia and Andrew Bogut, plus one of Curry or Green, also count among the league’s best in recent seasons. The Warriors’ dominance, unsurprisingly, rippled throughout the roster.
The problem is that it won’t in 2019-20. Golden State doesn’t have superlative high-end talent anymore, at least until Thompson is back to full-strength, and more importantly, sorely lacks the “Strength In Numbers” that defined its first title team and propelled them to 73 wins.
Curry, Green and D’Angelo Russell are the only consensus starter-level players on the roster. We’re high on Kevon Looney, especially now that he’s planning to shoot threes on a consistent basis, but there’s understandable debate about his value. The Warriors are hopeful Willie Cauley-Stein, abandoned by the Sacramento Kings, will thrive in a more defined role. Glenn Robinson III is the Warriors’ fifth starter, but it’s unclear, entering his sixth season with his fifth different team, what abject positive he brings to the floor. It’s remiss for a team to count on the availability of Alec Burks. Golden State took a training-camp flier on Marquese Chriss, and now he’s a meaningful member of the rotation. Jordan Poole has impressed with his scoring instincts and Eric Paschall has solid defensive tools, but expecting any rookie to meaningfully contribute, especially those drafted outside the lottery, is likely to end in disappointment.
No other team with legitimate playoff aspirations has a less proven, to put it politely, supporting cast than the Warriors. Complicating matters is that Kerr no longer has the personnel needed to employ his longtime systems on both sides of the ball. Golden State has little roster continuity and, without continuity of its scheme, too, has little more to fall back on other than the presence of Curry and Green.
Offensively, that equation will almost undoubtedly still add up to a top-10 unit. Curry makes the game that much easier for his teammates and, unleashed again as his team’s clear alpha dog, could put up big enough numbers to become just the ninth player ever to win a third MVP. Another dynamic ball-screen operator like Russell will make the game easier on Curry, too, and at least somewhat narrow the inevitable gulf between the Warriors’ effectiveness when the latter is on the court compared to when he’s on the bench.
It’s the other end of the floor that could doom Golden State. Green was playing more than 20 pounds overweight for most of last season, but it’s still instructive to remember that the Warriors finished 11th in defensive rating, tied for their worst showing in the Kerr era. Without switch-proof defenders like Durant, Thompson, Iguodala, Shaun Livingston and Jordan Bell, just what type of defense will Kerr and highly-respected coordinator Ron Adams implement?
That question may not be as pertinent to the Warriors’ ability to get stops as to how Green functions in his team’s new system. There’s no help defender in basketball smarter or more impactful than Green; he routinely makes offenses react to him rather than the other way around. But much of his value is derived from Green’s ability to guard all five players on the floor in isolation situations. With Golden State likely to play a more traditional brand of defense, far lighter on switching until late in the shot clock, just how large can Green’s influence loom?
Another factor that lowers the Warriors’ floor: age. Curry is already 31, and Green turns 30 in March. Both have played into June each of the last five seasons, and Golden State has long prioritized the big picture relating to rest. Curry and Green should be due for a decrease in playing time at this stage of their careers. Instead, even if they don’t see additional minutes, every possession during the regular season will prove a bit more onerous than those in recent years, as Curry and Green are tasked with almost single-handedly propping up the Warriors on offense and defense, respectively.
Of course, Golden State, whose flexibility is limited by the hard cap, has re-adjusted expectations for 2019-20. It’s no longer championship or bust in the Bay, and won’t be even if Thompson is able to return in time for a postseason run.
But just because the stakes have changed doesn’t mean missing the playoffs in perhaps the most competitive Western Conference ever will be an acceptable outcome. The deeper you dig into the Warriors’ potential strengths and weaknesses, the clearer it becomes that Curry and Green, despite so many years of historic success, may not be enough to take them there.
High-Performance Mindfulness: Solving Ben Simmons’ Shot
Jake Rauchbach provides alternative Integrated Player Development solutions in the case that Ben Simmons continues to experience chronic shooting issues.
Ben Simmons made his first career three-point shot during an Oct. 8 preseason game in Philadelphia versus the Guangzhou Long-Lions of the Chinese Basketball League. Sixers fans are now waiting in anticipation to see if Simmons emerges as a consistent shotmaker.
The made three-pointer, combined with offseason footage showing his ability to consistently knock down perimeter shots, could be signs that shooting efficiency improvement is imminent for Simmons.
Predicting whether or not Simmons improves his shotmaking ability this season is not our aim. However, providing leading-edge player development solutions if Simmons’ improvement is not a smooth line upwards, is.
In this piece, we will also examine common underlying causes for players who have experienced chronic shooting issues. Before we can understand these issues, we must first take a look at the components that make up a player’s shot.
The Layers to Shooting Efficiency
When improving shooting consistency over a period of time, there are several levels to the player’s jump shot that should be considered.
The Physical: Form and structure is the outward compilation of a player’s inner dynamics. On-court shot repetition is requisite for engraining new subconscious behavior, such as muscle memory of an effective shot. When a player’s form changes from shot-to-shot, or if there is an inconsistent percentage, more often than not, there are deeper issues at play.
The Mental: Mental interferences can affect form and consistency. For example, the thoughts and memories from chronically bad shooting performances can linger within a player’s psyche if not specifically addressed.
Negatively charged thoughts from a 0-for-11 game in high school can still be adversely affecting the veteran professional player. These blocks can affect focus, confidence, form and consistency.
Generally, these barriers to success are stored on the subconscious level of the mind.
The Emotional: Emotional blocks, such as embarrassment and frustration from bad misses, can lead to inconsistency and vacillation in shooting form. Players often carry around past emotional experiences. If left unchecked, they can throw off something as refined as a shooting motion. For Simmons, a big part of why he has been so hesitant is that he still may hold subconscious barriers such as these within the deep psyche.
The Energetic: The Energetic or Quantum level is the deepest aspect of the player. Often, the underlying cause of any shooting efficiency can be tracked back to here. A lack of flow in the physical body, mind or emotional body, can be detrimental to a player’s shooting motion and efficiency. Background information on this can be found here.
The Underlying Cause of Chronic Shooting Issues
Very rarely does the underlying cause lie in the player’s shooting mechanics.
Ineffectual mechanics and shooting inefficiency almost always map back to the DEEP psyche. The subconscious mind, also known as muscle memory, can hold performance inhibiting mental, emotional and energetic blocks from past on and off-court experience.
This is especially true for players like Simmons, who go through a season or more of chronic shooting issues. Mental and emotional elements, like fear, self-doubt and hesitancy can do a number on a player’s psyche.
Even in situations where they may not mean to, players are always building habits on the physical, mental, emotional and energetic levels. Habits that are built through shooting struggles can remain with the player for years.
If you have been following this column, we have talked extensively about Nick Anderson’s struggles. This example can provide context. In regards to Simmons, the same subconscious dynamic could be at play.
Attacking chronic shooting issues solely from the physical repetition side can produce mixed results. A one-sided approach like this can overlook the psychosomatic issues that are underlying the player’s shaky shooting performance.
Taking a look at Simmons’ summertime footage, and preseason three-point make, it looks as if his shooting mechanics are fluid and in rhythm.
(Courtesy: Synergy Sports)
Comparing this to his three-point attempts taken within the flow of the 76ers offense during the 2018-2019 season, it appears as if Simmons is taking steps forward.
(Courtesy: Synergy Sports)
However, it is important to not confuse initial progress with permanent improvement. For Simmons, there could be psychosomatic hurdles at play, which if left unresolved could hinder his sustained improvement in the shooting department.
The Integrated Player Development Approach
There is the chance that the 76ers point man could be off to the races with his shooting percentage improvement.
In the case that he is not, tweaking his current player development process to address the inevitable volatility from the mental and emotional side could work to stabilize his shooting efficiency.
Integrated Player Development combining on-court skill work with Energy Psychology implemented early, often and continuously throughout the season provides the highest probability to do this.
Off-court High-Performance Mindfulness sessions, in-game refocusing techniques and on-court skill development could be most effective in doing this.
NBA Daily: Who Will Be King Of LA?
With the NBA season upon us, Jordan Hicks takes a look at the two favorites to win it all – who both happen to hail from the City of Angels – and points out why a certain team could end up on top.
As we all know, since the Lakers lost last night, they are overrated, don’t have nearly enough shooting and are overall an ugly fit on the court. If the Lakers would’ve won, they’d be the front-runners for a ring, gel perfectly and could score from anywhere on the court. The best part of the NBA is that it’s a marathon – not a sprint. Sure, all 82 games matter, but it’s not very likely that a single regular-season game holds much of anything come playoff time.
What we are going to explore in this article will be a look into who really has what it takes to be the top-dog out of Los Angeles this season. Both teams are considered to be top-three finishers in most people’s rankings, but who has a better chance of getting a higher-seed, making it further in the playoffs and – in the end – hoisting the Larry O’Brien?
Let’s first take a look at some of the predictions featuring these teams that stem from Basketball Insider’s yearly NBA Predictions article (found here) and break them down, starting with the Lakers.
The Los Angeles Lakers will not be a top-four seed in the Western Conference
At first glance, this take seems off. The Lakers have LeBron James and Anthony Davis – how could they finish anything other than the top two? But when you dig into the facts, it seems plausible.
LeBron’s last season in Cleveland ended as the fourth seed. The year prior – although they were the best team out East – they still nabbed just the second seed.
Anthony Davis has never finished higher than a sixth seed and only ever helped New Orleans to the playoffs twice since being drafted in 2012.
Combining Davis and James certainly improve the chances of the Lakers getting a higher seed in the playoffs, no one will argue that, but things are different this time around, too. LeBron is a year older. He and Davis have yet to play any official basketball together. And, most importantly, they are in the Western Conference. Yes, the same conference where non-playoff teams would be a top-four seed in the East.
LeBron’s wake-up call in the West was missing the playoffs for the first time since his second season. Yes, he missed a chunk of the season due to injury, but they still lost enough key games with him on the floor to not use it as an outright excuse.
Is this is a hot take? It should be considered lukewarm at best. The Lakers have enough talent to finish as a top-four seed, but there’s a real chance they won’t. They’ll be directly competing with the Clippers, Rockets, Jazz, Nuggets, and Trail Blazers for home court in round one, and I don’t think anyone apart from LeBron superfans will be surprised if they fall to a fifth-or-worse seed come playoff time.
Despite the eventual whispers about Frank Vogel’s job security, he will end the season as head coach of the Lakers
This one is interesting. Vogel was not the sexy name coach that many had envisioned when he was selected to head the Lakers. He had success early on in his career, leading Indiana to back-to-back conference finals appearances, but was most recently coaching Orlando to just 25 wins in the 2017-18 season. To say he was the Lakers’ first choice is laughable, but he wasn’t a horrible hire considering who was available.
Yes, there may be whispers of him being fired if they get off to a slow start, but the Lakers have too much talent to assume Vogel won’t make it until at least the offseason before they consider letting him go. Then, maybe the dream of every NBA Twitter user will come true and the Lakers will hire Magic Johnson as the head coach for the 2020-21 season. No? Yeah, that definitely won’t happen.
Now, moving on to the Clippers.
Los Angeles Clippers – NBA Champions
Clippers over the Philadelphia 76ers seems to be the consensus when it comes to the ending of the season. And how can you see it another way? On one hand, we can’t keep expecting LeBron to turn in these super-human performances. One of the few players who kept up exceptional play deep into his career was Karl Malone, but even he started playing professionally after multiple years of college ball. LeBron came straight from high school. The man has literal MILES on his body.
On the other hand, the Clippers are downright good. The team is largely the same from last season where they won two games on the road against a healthy Warriors team that included Kevin Durant. Add to that roster one Paul George and one Kawhi Leonard – those are *pretty* solid additions. The Lakers may have added AD, but they had to gut the core of their roster to do so. The Clippers didn’t lose all that much if we are being honest. Danilo Gallinari is nice, but not essential, and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander will be really solid one day, but he wasn’t necessarily moving the needle. Even better, the Clippers held on to the most valuable rookie on their roster last season in Landry Shamet. He shot 45 percent from three last season after being dealt to the Clippers!
The Lakers will be good, no doubt. But the Clippers just might be better. And that will be enough to get them to and past The Finals as champions.
Andre Iguodala will be traded – but not to the Lakers or Clippers
This seems very realistic. Iguodala will likely be on the move. He won’t want to play for the Grizzles and in turn, Memphis will gladly accept any asset that Iguodala returns, but it’s just doubtful that either Los Angeles team will have the best offer.
Virtually every other team in the West will have someone or something that exceeds what the Lakers or Clippers can offer, so neither franchise will be able to net the veteran forward for some significant playoff help.
Whose roster is better?
The Clippers have the superior head coach in Doc Rivers, superior duo (very slightly) in Kawhi Leonard and Paul George and the superior role players in Montrezl Harrell, Landry Shamet, Lou Williams, and Patrick Beverley, to name a few. It wouldn’t be out of pocket to say that both LeBron James and Anthony Davis are individually better than both Leonard and George.
What this means is that the George-Leonard duo meshes better. In that, you have two elite defenders, as well as two incredibly talented shooters and playmakers. They are both long and athletic, and both have the ability to change the flow of the game at almost every level. LeBron and AD may be objectively better players, but no matter how well they play together, it likely won’t be on the same field as PG and the newly-dubbed “Terminator.”
The last few paragraphs make it seem like the Clippers are hands-down better than the Lakers, but that just isn’t the case. If LeBron can get back to the same form he had during the 2017-18 playoff run, the Lakers will be scary good. Davis is still young and should be plenty healthy with his lack of play last season. The same goes for LeBron. If those two can find a groove, there isn’t a single team in the NBA with a duo that is defensively skilled enough to stop them. The Lakers’ defense will certainly be called into questions at times, but both JaVale McGee and AD are ample enough rim protectors to keep it from becoming too much of an issue.
Another factor that may push the Lakers past the Clippers is the injury issues that could end up haunting the red and blue brand. George will miss the first 10-plus games recovering from dual shoulder surgery. Kawhi, on the other hand, has quite a history of random injuries and more-than-normal load management DNPs. If they lose key games due to inactive players, it could really mess up their seeding and cause them to lose a seven-game series largely due to missing out on homecourt.
With all this being said, it seems plausible that Clippers come out as the kings of LA. The Lakers just don’t have the overall talent to match the Clippers.
But if anything, the game you witnessed last night will have loads of information to analyze and digest moving forward. Just, please, take the results with a grain of salt. As previously mentioned, the NBA season is long. But one thing is certain: we as viewers are in for an incredible ride this year!